Decisional Sequencing: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion by Clermont, Kevin M.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers Faculty Scholarship
8-15-2010
Decisional Sequencing: Limitations from
Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion
Kevin M. Clermont
Cornell Law School, kmc12@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers
Part of the Legal History, Theory and Process Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clermont, Kevin M., "Decisional Sequencing: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion" (2010). Cornell Law
Faculty Working Papers. Paper 77.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/77
         8 / 15 / 2010 
Decisional Sequencing: Limitations from Jurisdictional 
Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion 
Kevin M. Clermont* 
 
 This Article treats the order of decision on multiple issues in a single case. That order can 
be very important, with a lot at stake for the court, society, and parties. Generally speaking, by 
weighing those various interests, the judge gets to choose the decisional sequence, although the 
parties can control which issues they put before the judge. 
 The law sees fit to put few limits on the judge’s power, and properly so. The few limits 
are in fact quite narrow in application, and even narrower if properly understood. The Steel Co.-
Ruhrgas rule generally requires a federal court to decide Article III justiciability and subject-
matter jurisdiction before ruling on the merits. The Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen rule requires a 
federal trial judge to avoid preclusion by giving first to the jury a factual issue common to the 
merits of both law and equity claims for relief joined in the same case. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 “The evidence and arguments a district court considers in the class 
certification decision call for rigorous analysis,” warned the appellate court in the 
celebrated class action called In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation.1 For 
certification, the court explained, the class representative must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the case satisfies the requirements for class 
treatment. “An overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of 
a claim is no reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to 
determine whether a class certification requirement is met.”2 
 
 In other words, after electing to pose a threshold question, the legal system 
advises the trial court just to plow ahead, even though the judge will encounter an 
issue that may arise for decision on the merits at trial in the same formulation and 
under the same standard of proof. To alleviate any discomfort generated by such a 
view, the Third Circuit resorted to unsupported pronouncement perhaps without 
the requisite “rigorous analysis,” mustering this dictum: “Although the district 
court’s findings for the purpose of class certification are conclusive on that topic, 
they do not bind the fact-finder on the merits.”3 Where did the court get that idea? 
When is a judge really free to decide the order of decision, even without worry of 
untoward preclusion? 
 
I. DECISIONAL SEQUENCING 
 
 Before deciding a case and uttering the necessary legal pronouncements, 
the court must confront a series of issues, a series that may be sequenced in any of 
numerous ways. Deciding the order of decision is among the law’s most basic 
decisions. Who decides the order of decision? Although parties generally control 
the issues put before the judge, the judge generally decides the sequence of 
decision.4 
                                                 
 
1552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008) (involving antitrust conspiracy action by purchasers of 
hydrogen peroxide and related chemical products against chemical manufacturers); see Linda S. 
Mullenix, Class Certification, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 26, 2009, at 9, 9 (describing Hydrogen Peroxide as 
potentially “the most influential decision relating to class certification” of the decade). 
 
2In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir. 2008). The quoted 
views conform to today’s usual approach. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. It is the ever 
more important approach as more courts are getting into the merits to screen out class actions at 
the certification stage. See Steig D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The Misguided Trend Toward 
Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935 
(2009). 
 
3In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
4See Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572709 (Mar. 1, 2010) (providing the only general treatment of 
sequencing and the interests at stake in an excellent article, which considers only the alternative-
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 Of course, I am talking here of formal legal reasoning, not intuitive 
decisionmaking. One significant setting in legal reasoning for exploring the 
sequencing decision is where the court faces alternative grounds for disposition, 
that is, an array of open routes to disposing of the claim, one way or the other. 
The best specific example is where a defendant has raised a number of defenses, 
so that the court might decide for the defendant because of lack of jurisdiction or 
improper venue or the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim or the defendant’s 
affirmative defense. The sequence obviously matters, because the consequence is 
that the court reaches some issues and does not reach other issues. Among much 
else, the amount of effort by the court, the kind of law made, and the parties’ 
discovery needs all turn on the sequence of decision. The law could impose a 
sequencing rule, dictating the order in which the court must decide the defenses. 
Or the law could leave it up to the judge’s discretion. 
 
 This example of alternative grounds of dismissal gives a useful sense of 
what a sequencing rule is: a binding direction that the court face this issue before 
that issue. My interest is more general than that example, however. The order in 
which the court confronts nondispositive issues also matters. It affects the course 
of a case’s progress. Parties care about it mostly because an early victory on some 
issue, or even the threatened intrusiveness of early attention to certain issues, can 
shift their settlement leverage dramatically. Moreover, what is at stake for them 
will increase to the extent that foreclosure of a decided issue is possible later in 
the case. That latter concern prompted the dictum in the Hydrogen Peroxide case, 
whereby the appellate court assured readers that the judge’s class certification 
decision would not bind a jury on common issues intertwined in the merits. 
Therefore, because the decisional sequence can always have effects, the law could 
conceivably dictate sequencing in any setting. 
 
A. Discretion 
 
 It turns out that the judges have a lot of freedom to sequence issues as the 
judges wish. In the wide realm of freedom that judges enjoy in deciding the order 
of decision, what factors guide them? Three general categories of factors 
predominate, as suggested by the pioneering work of Professor Rutledge.5 
 
 First, and obviously, judicial economy plays a major role. The court’s 
being free to pick and choose which issue to address first will affect the total 
amount of effort required. Most notably, among alternative grounds for 
disposition, proceeding immediately to the easiest and surest ground that ends the 
                                                                                                                                     
grounds-of-dismissal scenario but widens the focus to explore that sequencing problem as it exists 
between trial and appellate courts and between courts in different jurisdictions). 
 
5See id. at 19-27. 
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case would tend to lessen judicial workload. The court could thereby avoid shaky 
decisions of difficult issues. Ease of disposition reflects a variety of factors that go 
beyond a limited need for research and deliberation, such as the ease of 
considering objective matters rather than subjective matters. Sureness of 
disposition pays the various premiums of clarity of outcome in the trial court, as 
well as minimization of costs on appeal. 
 
 In the sequencing of nondispositive issues, choosing a certain path also 
might decrease judicial effort. Awareness that most cases end in settlement might 
counsel a particular sequence of least effort. Even legal logic (such as liability 
should come before remedy, or elements of the claim come before affirmative 
defenses) or pure logic (deductive logic prompts a certain order, or reflective 
equilibrium imposes an iteration) might suggest a path of decision that reduces 
mental effort. 
 
 Additionally, there is often a practicality in following a certain order 
(preliminary relief comes before final relief, or factual issues need to be tried 
toward the end), but these are not strictly binding rules of sequencing. More 
toward the substantive side of things, the law might provide an “if-then” 
relationship that appears to dictate a sequence. That is, although not as commonly 
as one would suppose, the law might say that some issue needs to be decided a 
certain way before a desirable procedure or remedy can be followed or pursued. 
The best example is the rule that the plaintiff must show an inadequate remedy at 
law in order to make an equitable remedy available.6 But really these propositions 
too are matters of practicality rather than mandated sequencing. The proof lies in 
thinking of these propositions in the alternative-grounds-of-dismissal scenario: the 
court can then sequence as it wishes, so that the court could first decide that no 
equitable remedy exists and hence avoid deciding inadequacy of the legal remedy. 
Even when applying these propositions to nondispositive issues, the court could 
actually decide in any order it wishes, even though it usually is more economic to 
decide the “if” before the “then.” 
 
 Second, other institutional factors may suggest a certain sequence. A trial 
judge may very well choose to foster institutional interests by adopting a certain 
sequence; for example, the judge might take into account that the sequence will 
affect the output of precedent and thus the development of the law. There are also 
prudential doctrines, like the passive virtue of avoiding constitutional issues,7 or 
                                                 
 
6See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§ 22, 43 (2d 
ed. 1948). 
 
7See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 
847 (2005) (lamenting the many exceptions to that presumption). Compare Alexander M. Bickel, 
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961), 
with Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and 
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
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considerations of judicial restraint and federalism that counsel avoiding certain 
issues when possible. These factors too are not strictly binding rules of 
sequencing even if hierarchically announced, but instead they act as a way of 
informing the trial courts’ discretion by identifying particularly weighty factors. 
Moreover, there are certain issues marked as threshold issues, like class 
certification,8 that require early attention as a gatekeeping mechanism. But these 
are more timing guidelines than sequencing rules. 
 
 Third, the sequence can affect the substantive goals of law. It surely 
impacts the parties’ interests. It affects the parties’ litigation behavior, such as in 
choosing which issues to raise in the hope of constraining the judge’s sequencing. 
Even more clearly, it affects their settlement leverage; for example, the court’s 
ability to skip over some jurisdictional issues and allow the plaintiff to pursue 
discovery and decision on the merits will often work to the disadvantage of 
defendants.9 A trial judge may take the goals of law into account in setting a 
sequence, although presumably maintenance of neutrality between the parties 
should be the judge’s strongest motive here. 
 
 Even with so much at stake in the sequencing decision, lawmakers choose 
usually not to impose mandatory sequencing rules on judges. This Article will try 
to delineate the wide extent of the judges’ freedom to sequence. 
 
B. Rules 
 
 The suggestive discussion above of the factors relevant to sequencing 
shows the picture to be so complicated that, presumptively, lawmakers should 
stay out and just leave it up to the judges’ discretion. However, given the 
reasonable assumption that judges tend to act in self-interest, judges may too 
heavily weigh the first factor of minimizing workload.10 Thus, lawmakers may 
                                                 
 
8See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after a person sues or is 
sued as a class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a 
class action.”); 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785.3, at 453 (3d ed. 2005) (“The time at which the court finds it 
appropriate to make its class-action determination may vary with the circumstances of the 
particular case.”). 
 
9See Rutledge, supra note 4, at 27: 
Flexible sequencing rules strengthen a defendant’s position in settlement because the 
defendant has more avenues available to it for immediate dismissal with a lower risk of 
an adverse ruling. By contrast, rigid sequencing rules strengthen a plaintiff’s position in 
settlement because the mandatory sequence enables the plaintiff to obtain a favorable 
ruling on an early issue and, depending on the availability of jurisdictional discovery, 
drive up the defendant’s costs early in the dispute. 
 
10See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of 
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994) (arguing that judicial response to various legal rules is 
often the result of judges’ self-interest); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices 
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39 (1993) (stating 
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need to regulate in order to protect the other public and private interests at stake, 
at least when their neglect would come at an especially high cost. But still, 
intervention should be the exception. 
 
 Conforming to that conservative view on the normative question, the 
descriptive fact is that, on the civil side, there are remarkably few external 
limitations on the trial judges’ freedom to sequence. The legislative branch has 
been wholly inactive. Perhaps interest groups have formulated insufficient 
concern over the subtleties of sequencing and so exerted no pressure. The 
judiciary has intervened seldom. Perhaps institutional worries are usually too 
small to generate higher courts’ concern over trial judges’ sequencing 
performance. 
 
 In current law I see only two sequencing rules of significance, given the 
above-described narrow definition of what constitutes such a rule. They both 
derive from judicial interpretations of the Constitution, and they are very heavily 
dependent on concerns linked to federal courts. Interestingly, they both embroil 
the commentator quickly and thoroughly in matters of res judicata—without 
careful attention to preclusion these two sequencing rules will ever remain 
mysterious. The first of the rules arises from the scenario of alternative grounds 
for disposition that the defendant chose to put before the court, while the second 
involves the more general scenario of multiple issues. 
 
 The major limitation extant is that of the Steel Co.11 and Ruhrgas12 line, 
which says that a federal court must decide a challenge to its jurisdiction over the 
case before dismissing on the merits. As this Article will explain, this rule boils 
down to a fairly modest constraint: one big exception is that the court still may 
pick among jurisdictional and other threshold defenses, with a dismissal on any 
one enjoying some preclusive effect.13 
 
 Another rule, deriving from the Beacon Theatres14 and Dairy Queen15 
cases, dictates that when a common factual issue is to come before both judge and 
jury, the jury must decide it first to avoid the preclusive effect of a judicial 
decision subverting the constitutional jury right in federal court. As this Article 
will also explain, this rule is very narrow too: it applies only to trial of factual 
                                                                                                                                     
as plausible that “judicial effort has a diminishing effect on the satisfactions from judicial 
voting”). 
 
11Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
 
12Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999).  
 
13See infra Part II. 
 
14Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
 
15Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
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issues common to the merits of both law and equity claims for relief joined in the 
same case.16 
 
C. Fog 
 
 Although lawmakers impose little constraint on the judges’ freedom to 
sequence, the prevailing lack of clarity about the existence and scope of the 
sequencing rules works to constrain judges more broadly. The court might be very 
unsure of when it can skip over jurisdiction. Or it may worry that an early 
decision will bind its subsequent decision of overlapping matters. Consider, for 
example, this district court’s concerned musings about deciding a typical issue of 
personal jurisdiction that involved issues in common with the merits: 
 
If the [threshold-decision] course were undertaken, the court might be 
deciding key fact issues that, if the doctrine of estoppel were not applied, 
would be resubmitted for jury determination at trial, thus making wasteful 
use of scarce judicial resources and also creating a possibility of 
inconsistent findings by the court on motion and the jury at trial. If 
estoppel were applied on the basis of the court’s resolution of the issues, 
thereby precluding waste and inconsistency, then either the court must 
impanel a jury just to try those issues for disposition of the motion—a 
dubious procedure at best—or else the parties would effectively be denied 
jury trial on those issues because the court’s findings on them when 
determining the motion would preclude their resubmission at jury trial.17 
 
 To the extent that such confusion creates a broader constraint than the 
lawmaker intended, the constraint is undesirable. Hence, bringing clarity should 
be beneficial. Clarification of the rules of sequencing, then, is another aim of this 
Article. 
 
II. JURISDICTIONAL PRIMACY 
 
 Our law’s foremost sequencing rule says that a federal court’s decision on 
a challenge to its jurisdiction must come before decision on the merits.18 To 
understand that rule, which as already mentioned stems from the Steel Co.19 and 
                                                 
 
16See infra Part III. 
 
17North Am. Video Corp. v. Leon, 480 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Mass. 1979); see Kevin M. 
Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 978-1000 (2006) (calming this particular 
worry by establishing that the standard of proof for jurisdiction is less demanding than the 
standard applicable to the merits). 
 
18See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
1411-17 (6th ed. 2009). 
 
19Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998). 
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Ruhrgas20 cases, one must first draw the subtle distinction between 
“nonbypassability” and “resequencing.”21 
 
 Nonbypassability, or the requirement to decide first things first, rests 
mainly on the Steel Co. case. A court cannot skip over a challenge to subject-
matter jurisdiction in order to dismiss on the merits, even though finding a lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction would likewise have produced a victory for the 
defendant. So, when I say a defense is “nonbypassable,” I mean that a court 
cannot skip over it and instead dismiss on the merits. The sequencing rule is 
subject-matter jurisdiction first. 
 
 Resequencing, which received its blessing in Ruhrgas, avoids this 
sequencing rule. It allows courts to avoid decision on subject-matter jurisdiction 
by hypothesizing its existence in order to dismiss on other threshold grounds with 
a binding effect. A court can skip over challenged subject-matter jurisdiction to 
dismiss, say, for lack of personal jurisdiction. So, when I say a defense is 
“resequenceable,” I mean that a court can choose to dismiss on it without first 
facing a nonbypassable defense like subject-matter jurisdiction. 
 
A. Nonbypassability, or Deciding First Things First 
 
 Nonbypassability has obvious sequencing implications for judicial 
decisionmaking. Courts must decide in a certain order if a nonbypassability rule is 
in place. To the extent that courts are uncertain about the reach of that rule, but 
wish to avoid reversal, they will follow it even when it does not apply. Thus, 
some attention to the rule’s precise meaning is in order. 
 
1. Rule 
 
 Drawing on a line of precedent stretching way back,22 Steel Co. held that 
the lower federal court could not dismiss for failure to state a claim without first 
deciding a challenge to Article III standing23 (which, according to the Court, was 
lacking in the case but posed a harder question to resolve).24 Even though the 
result was the same—judgment for defendant—the federal court could not give a 
judgment on the merits without first ascertaining it had jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
 
20Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-88 (1999).  
 
21See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal 
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 92-94 (2001) (providing the best treatment of this doctrine). 
 
22See Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804) (allowing the plaintiff to 
raise original subject-matter jurisdiction on appeal). 
 
23See generally 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 9-16, §§ 3531.4-3531.6 (3d ed. 2008). 
 
24Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998). 
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 The Court rested its decision on separation of powers and the requirement 
of a case or controversy. In order for courts to stay within their proper limits, they 
cannot go about rendering a decision on the merits without making sure that the 
case fell within the courts’ jurisdictional bounds. Based on its reasoning and 
wording, by “jurisdiction” the Court meant Article III justiciability25 as well as 
more ordinary subject-matter jurisdiction.26 The Court itself has never added 
anything to that short list of nonbypassable defenses. 
 
2. Exception 
 
 Steel Co. represented the high water mark for the nonbypassability 
doctrine. The Court’s opinion itself was far from definitive on whether 
jurisdiction must come before everything else. The majority itself admitted that 
precedent had “diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is 
always an antecedent question.”27 And the separate opinions of six of the Justices 
went further in underlining that qualification.28 
 
 The Court’s subsequent cases have indeed cut back on Steel Co.’s seeming 
thrust by drawing a line between nonmerits and merits and by then ruling that a 
federal court can dismiss on nonmerits grounds without reaching Article III 
justiciability or subject-matter jurisdiction.29 The fountainhead case of Ruhrgas, 
in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg one year after Steel Co., held that a 
court may resequence nonmerits defenses in a way such that the court faces a 
                                                 
 
25See generally 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & 
RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529 (3d ed. 2008). 
 
26See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998) (referring to the 
“statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction,” the Court ruled: “For a court to 
pronounce upon the [merits] when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court 
to act ultra vires.”). 
 
27Id. at 101; see infra note 98 (collecting cases). 
 
28Jack H. Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258, 265-66 
(2000) (footnotes omitted), described the concurring opinion of Justice O’Connor, the opinion of 
Justice Breyer concurring in part and in the judgment, and the opinions of Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg concurring in the judgment:  
 To summarize the positions of the various Justices: Justices Rehnquist and 
Thomas join the more traditional view espoused by Justice Scalia and denounce 
“hypothetical jurisdiction” but do not completely shut the door . . . . Justice Breyer 
clearly approves of “hypothetical jurisdiction” in some circumstances and both Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy leave open the question of if and when “hypothetical 
jurisdiction” should be permitted, but indicate that the doctrine has some validity. Justice 
Stevens, with whom Justice Souter concurred, at the very least leaves open the question 
of “hypothetical jurisdiction” or approves of it, depending upon which portion of the 
opinion one relies upon. Only Justice Ginsburg refused to be drawn into the discussion, 
and it was she who wrote the unanimous opinion in Ruhrgas. 
 
29See infra note 100 (collecting cases). 
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personal jurisdiction defense before deciding a subject-matter jurisdiction 
defense.30 
 
 As discussed below,31 one might argue that the list of nonmerits defenses 
eligible for resequencing remains especially unclear. Nevertheless, it is absolutely 
clear that this list of resequenceable threshold matters is not the same as, and is in 
fact much longer than, the list of fundamental matters that a federal court cannot 
bypass in favor of the merits. The Steel Co. case used the example of statutory 
standing32 as a resequenceable defense that could precede subject-matter 
jurisdiction, as well as a defense that the court could bypass in order to dismiss on 
the merits.33 But that is just one example. A court can also bypass prudential 
standing34 and a host of other resequenceable threshold issues.35 
 
3. Nonbypassable Grounds 
 
 So, more precisely, which defenses can a court not bypass in order to get 
to the merits? To appear on the list of nonbypassable defenses, a ground must 
involve a pretty basic matter in the nature of subject-matter jurisdiction. As the 
D.C. Circuit put it, “ ‘a less than pure jurisdictional question, need not be decided 
before a merits question.’ ”36 
 
 To repeat, most entries on the longer list of resequenceable threshold 
matters are bypassable. The prime, and largely determinative, question in relating 
the two lists is whether a court can bypass the resequenceable defense of personal 
jurisdiction.37 So, can a court pass over personal jurisdiction in order to dismiss 
on the merits? 
 
                                                 
 
30Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-88 (1999) (treating personal 
jurisdiction as resequenceable). 
 
31See infra text accompanying notes 96-126. 
 
32See generally 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.13 (3d ed. 2008). 
 
33See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 n.2 (1998) (detailing 
expressly that a court can bypass a statutory standing question and go to the merits, but a court can 
resequence that question before an Article III justiciability or subject-matter jurisdiction defense). 
 
34See generally 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3531, at 9-16. 
 
35See Idleman, supra note 21, at 93, 95-97. Compare In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 
F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding a court can bypass federal sovereign 
immunity for the merits), with Galvan v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (holding a court can resequence federal sovereign immunity). 
 
36In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) 
(quoting United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999)).  
 
37See Idleman, supra note 21, at 95. 
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 Although the cases before Steel Co. were split on this question,38 since 
then they are perhaps leaning more toward no.39 Most disturbingly, the Supreme 
Court seems to have assumed no. In its latest case in this line, Sinochem, the 
Court implied that personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction are 
equivalents for the purpose of the nonbypassability doctrine.40 In that case, the 
district court had held that it possessed admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction, but 
declined to decide personal jurisdiction and instead dismissed on forum non 
conveniens grounds. The court of appeals agreed on subject-matter jurisdiction, 
but held that the court could not skip over personal jurisdiction. The Supreme 
Court reversed, allowing dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds without 
decision on personal jurisdiction. The course of decision had removed from the 
Court’s holding anything regarding bypassability of personal jurisdiction: its 
holding is perfectly consistent with a view that either forum non conveniens or the 
merits can precede personal jurisdiction. Also, because the lower courts had 
decided that subject-matter jurisdiction existed, the Court clarified little about 
resequenceability: its stated view that forum non conveniens is resequenceable 
before subject-matter jurisdiction is dictum. Indeed, the Court, in another 
unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg, taught little besides the fact that this 
doctrine has become too complicated for the Court itself. It most pointedly proved 
this by declaring that Steel Co., which in fact did not involve or discuss personal 
jurisdiction, “clarified that a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of 
a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim 
in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction).”41 That 
erroneous dictum will surely influence the lower courts in the future.42 
 
 I nevertheless think yes, a court can pass over personal jurisdiction in 
order to dismiss on the merits—in other words, personal jurisdiction is a 
resequenceable but bypassable defense. One reason is that Steel Co.’s concerns of 
separation of powers and the requirement of a case or controversy do not extend 
                                                 
 
38See id. at 95 nn.524-25. 
 
39Compare United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir. 1999), and 
Guidry v. United States Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 623 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999), with Pace v. Bureau 
of Prisons, No. 98-5025, 1998 WL 545414, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 1998) (per curiam), and 
United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 80 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (bypassing service of process for 
the merits). 
 
40Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007); see Nathan 
Viavant, Recent Development, Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping 
Corp.: The United States Supreme Court Puts Forum Non Conveniens First, 16 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 557, 571-72 (2008) (viewing Sinochem to be so unclear as to sow the seeds for the 
demise of the nonbypassability rule). 
 
41Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007). 
 
42See Dan v. Douglas County Dep’t of Corrections, No. 8:06CV714, 2009 WL 483837, at 
*3 (D. Neb. Feb. 25, 2009); Ashton v. Florala Memorial Hosp., No. CIV.A. 206CV226-ID, 2007 
WL 1526837, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Ala. May 24, 2007). But see Di Loreto v. Costigan, 351 F. App’x 
747 (3d Cir. 2009) (bypassing personal jurisdiction for the merits). 
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to personal jurisdiction. Likewise, any concern of intruding on the states’ 
authority does not extend beyond subject-matter jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit 
again provided a good explanation: “The district court was not required to resolve 
the issue of personal jurisdiction prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim because personal jurisdiction exists to protect the liberty 
interests of defendants, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which serves as a 
limitation on judicial competence.”43 
 
 Moreover, the defendant, like the system, has no real grounds for 
complaining about the initial court bypassing personal jurisdiction. A victory on 
the merits, with its broad res judicata effects, is worth more to the defendant than 
a jurisdictional dismissal. The defendant has put multiple defenses before the 
court, and so has consented somewhat to any sort of sequencing.  
 
 However, the key difference between Article III justiciability and subject-
matter jurisdiction, on the one hand, and personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, 
is that a judgment that skips over the former might be a valid judgment under the 
doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction as elaborated in the famed Chicot 
case.44 This doctrine means that a judgment that has intruded on other branches or 
imperiled federalism can nonetheless stand safe from challenge. Notwithstanding 
all the slogans about subject-matter jurisdiction’s fundamental importance, the 
offense to the systemic interests at stake is not great enough always to warrant 
relief from judgment—unlike the more individual interests wrapped up in the 
often constitutionally based intricacies of personal jurisdiction. A defendant who 
has not waived an undecided personal jurisdiction defense should be able to raise 
it to obtain relief from judgment.45 After a court bypassed personal jurisdiction 
and dismissed the case on other grounds, the defendant could get relief from the 
judgment if the defendant, who is the only concerned party, were ever to need 
such relief. 
 
 Therein lies the key to understanding nonbypassability. The list of 
nonbypassable items should not turn solely on the relative importance of defenses, 
which would open fruitless debate on the stature of subject-matter jurisdiction 
                                                 
 
43Pace v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98-5025, 1998 WL 545414, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 
1998) (per curiam) (distinguishing Steel Co.). 
 
44Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940) (precluding a 
defaulted defendant from collateral attack on subject-matter jurisdiction grounds, after other 
defendants had appeared and litigated the case without raising subject-matter jurisdiction and after 
the prior court had canceled the defendants’ bonds); see infra text accompanying notes 55-62. A 
related assumed-jurisdiction mechanism, for foreclosing attack on challenged but skipped subject-
matter jurisdiction, entails the extension of hypothetical jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying 
notes 81-95. 
 
45See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.4(C) (2d ed. 2009) 
(explaining that waiver equates to jurisdiction by consent, but that a defaulting defendant can later 
challenge territorial jurisdiction or notice). 
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versus that of personal jurisdiction.46 The actual concern instead derives from the 
asymmetry between subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction under 
preclusion doctrine: unlitigated subject-matter jurisdiction can preclude. The fear 
is that a court will bypass some such prerequisite for adjudicating and then give a 
dismissal on the merits that is later unassailable. To avoid that result, the Court 
declares the preclusive prerequisite to be nonbypassable. 
 
 Now, it appears that when the law says a defense is “nonbypassable,” it 
means that if a court nevertheless purposefully skips the defense in order to give 
dismissal on the merits, no brand of assumed jurisdiction will protect the 
judgment from attack. When the law says that a court “cannot” bypass subject-
matter jurisdiction, it means that if the court violates the rule, a person can get 
relief from the judgment upon showing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, 
whether or not that person appealed the judgment. But that person cannot attack 
the judgment simply for violation of the nonbypassability rule, because that would 
be mere error and not a void judgment.47 
 
 Thus, the list of nonbypassable items should include only those 
requirements for a valid judgment that, if skipped over by the court, could 
otherwise be cut off as a ground for attack. Accordingly, that list of 
nonbypassable prerequisites should include subject-matter jurisdiction, but not 
territorial jurisdiction or notice. The authorities are lax in defining the precise 
scope of “subject-matter jurisdiction” as a requirement for validity.48 A lack of 
jurisdiction under Article III will result in relief from judgment.49 But the lesser 
aspects of justiciability will not.50 And courts need to keep jurisdiction and the 
                                                 
 
46But see Idleman, supra note 21, at 31-39. 
 
47See CLERMONT, supra note 45, § 5.1(B)(1) (explaining the concept of validity). 
 
48See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 (1982) (defining subject-matter 
jurisdiction as the court’s “authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action” 
and acknowledging that the authority may derive from constitutional or statutory provisions); 
Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 
164, 164 n.1 (1977). 
 
49See, e.g., Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 939, 954-55 
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (“Because there was no case or controversy, this court lacked constitutional 
power to enter judgment against defendants.”), rev’d on other grounds, 402 F.3d 1198 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 
50See, e.g., Mendell v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731-32 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Plaintiff’s 
acquisition of a note following an adverse ruling on his claim to standing as a shareholder did not 
present the kind of “extraordinary” circumstance that mandates relief to avoid an ‘extreme and 
undue hardship.’”) (quoting Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1986)), aff’d on other 
grounds, 501 U.S. 115 (1991); Sarin v. Ochsner, 721 N.E.2d 932, 935 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) 
(“More important, even if the plaintiff had no such direct interest, the defendants may not raise the 
issue of standing in a rule 60(b) motion. Whether the facts of a given case meet the standard for 
exercising jurisdiction—here whether the plaintiff has standing—has been termed a ‘quasi-
jurisdictional’ determination.”). 
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merits separate for the purpose of validity, so that the attacker of the judgment 
cannot litigate the merits anew.51 
 
 In sum, there is no significant reason that a court must decide the existence 
or not of personal jurisdiction before deciding the merits in the defendant’s favor. 
And with personal jurisdiction off the nonbypassability list, and with finally an 
understanding of the Court’s reason for creating the nonbypassability list, I 
become comfortable in asserting that the Steel Co. line of cases puts only Article 
III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction on the list of nonbypassable 
grounds. 
 
B. Resequencing, or Using Hypothetical Jurisdiction to Produce a “Valid” 
Invalid Judgment 
 
 Ruhrgas represents another aspect of jurisdictional primacy that is 
different in operation from nonbypassability. It allows resequencing of nonmerits 
defenses. Ruhrgas held that the lower federal court could dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction without first deciding subject-matter jurisdiction.52 
Subsequent cases have expanded the resequencing exception. Although a court 
cannot bypass subject-matter jurisdiction in favor of a disposition on the merits, it 
can skip over subject-matter jurisdiction to dismiss on, say, forum non 
conveniens.53 By being authorized to dismiss on some such nonjurisdictional 
threshold defense, a court becomes freer to pursue economically an easier and 
                                                 
 
51RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e (1982) acknowledges that the 
definition of jurisdiction is “particularly difficult when the issue determining subject matter 
jurisdiction parallels an issue going to the merits” but the modern tendency “is to reduce the 
vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.” It concludes: 
 In all such situations, the matter in question can plausibly be characterized either 
as going to subject matter jurisdiction or as being one of merits or procedure. The line 
between the categories is not established through refinement of terminology but through 
the cumulation of categorizing decisions into a pattern. The establishment of pattern is 
complicated by the fact that the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and merits 
or procedure has significance in contexts other than that concerning the vulnerability of a 
judgment to delayed attack. . . . 
 Whatever the context, the underlying question is how far to go in the direction 
of policing the boundaries of a court's subject matter jurisdiction, when the cost of 
intensive policing is to enlarge the vulnerability of the proceeding to interruption through 
extraordinary writ or the like and to belated attack after it has gone to judgment. 
See Morrison v. National Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010); Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 
909, 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2010); Clermont, supra note 17, at 1017-20; Howard M. Wasserman, 
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547 (2008). 
 
52Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-88 (1999). 
 
53See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (dictum). 
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surer path, as long as the result is the same party prevailing as would if 
jurisdiction were denied.54 
 
 To understand the effect of resequencing, though, one must back up and 
consider some related doctrines. The place to begin is the doctrine of jurisdiction 
to determine jurisdiction. The reason to turn to it is that this doctrine relates to res 
judicata, and res judicata is where resequencing will ultimately take us. There 
follows a general description as means of orientation. 
 
1. Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction 
 
 The doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction treats a kind of 
question different from the normal application of res judicata: it does not involve 
preclusive use of determinations embedded in a valid judgment, but instead 
involves preclusive use of prior determinations underlying a judgment in order to 
establish its validity.55 That is to say, an affirmative ruling on subject-matter 
jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, or adequate notice can foreclose relitigation of 
that prior determination and so preclude the parties from attacking the resultant 
judgment by raising that ground in subsequent litigation. 
 
 It is true that if a defendant faces suit in a court that lacks jurisdiction or 
fails to give notice, the defendant ordinarily does not have to respond in any way. 
If the defendant takes no action of any kind in response to the suit, the court may 
enter a default judgment, but the judgment will be invalid. If the plaintiff should 
attempt to assert rights based on that judgment in a later suit involving the same 
defendant, the defendant ordinarily can avoid the effects of the judgment by 
showing that its entry was without jurisdiction or notice. The defendant has the 
right to a day in court on the question of the authority of the court that rendered 
the earlier judgment.56 
 
 However, the defendant may instead choose to raise the jurisdiction or 
notice issue in the initial action before the challenged court itself. Then, a court 
that otherwise lacks authority could conceivably have jurisdiction to determine 
whether it has jurisdiction and whether its notice was good, and its affirmative 
rulings on such questions could be binding on the defendant so as to preclude 
relitigation of the same questions. The defendant’s appearance in the challenged 
court would then be the defendant’s only day in court on the question of the 
forum’s authority. 
 
                                                 
 
54See Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
725, 742-46 (2009) (trying to characterize the doctrine as also serving judicial restraint). 
 
55See generally CLERMONT, supra note 45, §§ 4.4, 5.1(A)(3); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 16, at 95-97 (6th ed. 2002) . 
 
56See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 65-66 (1982). 
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 Our law in fact accepts this so-called bootstrap principle,57 and so allows a 
court lacking fundamental authority to issue a judgment that will nevertheless be 
immune from later attack. Because the issue of jurisdiction or notice was actually 
litigated and determined, even if erroneously, the defendant cannot relitigate the 
same issue in subsequent litigation. The defendant can obtain appellate review of 
the erroneous ruling, of course, but cannot challenge it upon seeking relief from 
judgment. Here the desire for finality outweighs the concern for validity.58 
 
 Indeed, our law accepts the bootstrap principle’s value of finality with true 
enthusiasm, despite its conflict with the intuitive value of validity. Our law 
applies the principle even more broadly than the foregoing illustration of actually 
litigated and determined forum-authority defenses. Strangely, this extension 
comes in connection with subject-matter jurisdiction, in spite of the traditional 
lore about subject-matter jurisdiction’s fundamental importance. On the one hand, 
as to unchallenged subject-matter jurisdiction in any action litigated to judgment 
by contesting parties, the implicit determination of the existence of subject-matter 
jurisdiction has the res judicata consequences of an actually litigated 
determination, insofar as foreclosing attack on the judgment goes.59 On the other 
hand, sometimes the interests inherent in subject-matter jurisdiction are just too 
important to ignore: even an express finding of the existence of subject-matter 
jurisdiction will not preclude the parties from attacking the resultant judgment on 
that ground in special circumstances, such as where the court plainly lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction or where the judgment substantially infringes on the 
authority of another court or agency.60 
 
 This doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction thus ends up being a 
bit peculiar. It constitutes a third body of res judicata law, distinguishable from 
claim and issue preclusion, or perhaps standing separate from res judicata. It is 
obviously similar to issue preclusion, but it differs in several respects.61 The 
                                                 
 
57See Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter 
Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491 (1967). 
 
58See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) (quasi in rem jurisdiction); Johnson v. 
Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951) (jurisdiction over status); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. 
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Baldwin v. Iowa State 
Traveling Men's Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931) (personal jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS §§ 10-12 (1982). 
 
59See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982); supra text accompanying 
note 44 (introducing the Chicot doctrine). 
 
60See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) (holding that a state-court proceeding 
could not preclude a bankruptcy proceeding); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 cmts. 
c, e (1982); Karen Nelson Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter Jurisdiction: A Critique of 
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 534 (1981). 
 
61See CLERMONT, supra note 45, § 5.1(A)(3), at 307 (footnotes omitted): 
First, issue preclusion requires a valid prior judgment. Jurisdiction to determine 
jurisdiction does not require validity, but instead works to make invulnerable what could 
otherwise be an invalid judgment. Second, issue preclusion applies only in a subsequent 
  
17 
reason for difference is that the policies that shape the doctrine of jurisdiction to 
determine jurisdiction are unique, and so they produce a unique set of rules. For 
related reasons tied to the notion that the doctrine most intimately defines the 
judgment, federal common law covers the doctrine of jurisdiction to determine 
jurisdiction as it relates to a prior federal judgment.62  
 
2. Jurisdiction to Determine No Jurisdiction 
 
 Passing beyond the res judicata effects of affirmative rulings on forum-
authority, what if the initial court decides that it lacks jurisdiction or failed to give 
notice and so dismisses? That is, can a court, which is admittedly without 
authority to enter a valid judgment, make any rulings that have preclusive effect? 
Yes, there exists a doctrine of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction.63 Courts 
and scholars have elaborated this doctrine less thoroughly than the jurisdiction-to-
determine-jurisdiction doctrine, and thus its reach remains more controversial. 
 
  A court should have authority to determine its lack of authority. The 
initial court’s ruling that it lacks authority should prevent a second try that 
presents exactly the same issue. One argument for giving it at least this minimal 
preclusive effect is that giving it no preclusive effect might raise the constitutional 
problem associated with advisory opinions.64 More to the point, common sense 
supports preclusion on the threshold issue, in order to prevent the plaintiff from 
suing repetitively. So, for such limited purpose, the prior judgment is a valid one. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
action, and so does not apply on a motion for relief from judgment, which is technically a 
continuation of the initial action. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, however, does 
apply to preclude a validity attack by such a motion, as well as by the other methods for 
relief from judgment. Third, issue preclusion usually does not work to bind the party 
prevailing on the issue. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction will preclude the successful 
plaintiff if the unsuccessful defendant would be precluded on the jurisdiction or notice 
issue. Fourth, issue preclusion applies only to issues actually litigated and determined. 
Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction sometimes applies to issues of subject-matter 
jurisdiction that were not litigated at all, and even against a defaulting party. Fifth, and 
most importantly, special policies and concerns are at work with respect to the 
jurisdiction and notice defenses, so the law needs to develop special rules and exceptions 
for jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. 
 
62See Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 396-98 (5th Cir. 2001). 
On the governing law for ordinary res judicata, see Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
531 U.S. 497 (2001); Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 
U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2003). 
 
63See generally CLERMONT, supra note 45, § 4.4(B)(3). 
 
64See Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and 
Jurisdictional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 212-13 (2001) (addressing the 
preclusive effect of a federal court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). 
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 Naturally, there should be limits to the res judicata effects.65 After all, the 
court is supposed to be deciding only its jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.66 
The dismissal of the initial action on a jurisdictional defense does not generate a 
bar to a second action in an appropriate court.67 Indeed, the initial court’s negative 
ruling on the jurisdictional issue should not have normal issue-preclusive effects 
in a later action, and so should not preclude an issue on the merits of the same or 
any other claim.68 For such purposes, the prior judgment is an invalid one. Many 
good reasons support such limits, including the notions that limited jurisdiction 
should yield limited effects69 and that the truncated procedure for deciding 
jurisdiction counsels against carrying jurisdictional determinations over to affect 
the merits.70 
 
 The driving idea is that because the prior court lacked jurisdiction, it 
should be able to preclude little more than is absolutely necessary. Therefore, the 
basic rule is that the preclusive effect of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction 
reaches no further than the precise issue of jurisdiction itself.71 It will defeat 
jurisdiction in any attempt to sue again in a second court where the same 
jurisdictional issue arises,72 even when one court is state and the other federal.73 
                                                 
 
65See id. at 206-22. 
 
66See Idleman, supra note 21, at 57-63. 
 
67See Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 (1866). 
 
68See Anusbigian v. Trugreen/Chemlawn, Inc., 72 F.3d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(“Thus, contrary to the plaintiff’s fear, expressed in his brief, that he might be foreclosed from 
seeking damages in state court under the doctrines of res judicata or ‘law of the case,’ the remand 
order forecloses nothing except further litigation of his claim in federal court.”); United States v. 
Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994) (“although Ritchie’s clients were barred (after Judge 
Jarvis’s ruling) from relitigating whether their motion to quash could be heard before the IRS 
brought an enforcement action, Judge Hull was not bound by any factual findings made by Judge 
Jarvis for the limited purpose of considering the jurisdictional challenge”); By-Prod Corp. v. 
Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Armen-Berry can sue By-Prod and Schiff 
under Article 14 of the Illinois Criminal Code in an Illinois court, and that court will not be bound 
by our reading of the Illinois law of punitive damages.”). But see infra note 91 and accompanying 
text. 
 
69See Edney, supra note 64, at 206-14. 
 
70See id. at 220-22. 
 
71See Idleman, supra note 21, at 29; Edney, supra note 64, at 217-18. It is true that 18A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4436, at 154 (2d ed. 2002), sounds more expansive: “Although a dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction does not bar a second action as a matter of claim preclusion, it does preclude 
relitigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdiction question.” But in fact the specific 
discussion and the cases cited conform to the idea that preclusion extends only to “the same issue 
of jurisdiction.” Id. at 150 n.3, 168. But see id. at 158 n.16. 
 
72See, e.g., Coors Brewing Co. v. Méndez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2009), 
abrogated on other grounds, Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010); Hill v. 
Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 2003); Bromwell v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 
208, 212-13 (3d Cir. 1997); Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 
73See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that “the Louisiana courts would be bound by our ruling that defendants had insufficient contacts 
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But a finding of no jurisdiction does not produce a generally valid judgment and 
so will not otherwise be binding in any other action. 
 
 Going beyond the basic, a determination of no jurisdiction probably 
should not provide nonmutual preclusion.74 Nor should it work to establish, rather 
than defeat, the jurisdiction of the other court.75 For example, a finding that a 
federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because of the nonexistence of 
some fact critical to exclusive jurisdiction should not force a state court to accept 
jurisdiction. Even though this limitation on preclusion might lead to awkward 
situations,76 an extension of binding effect to the unempowered federal court’s 
dismissal appears unnecessary and hence improper. Additionally, against 
preclusion one could argue that the burden of proof for defeating jurisdiction is 
often lighter than the burden of proof for establishing jurisdiction, and issue 
preclusion does not apply when the burden increases.77 This additional argument 
is not determinative, however, because the rules of jurisdiction to determine no 
jurisdiction can be specially tailored and need not conform to those of issue 
preclusion.78 
 
 The jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine is, however, not in 
all respects narrower than issue preclusion. The law’s capability to shape this 
special preclusion doctrine can broaden it. For example, by virtue of jurisdiction 
to determine no jurisdiction, an unreviewable remand for lack of removal 
jurisdiction might preclude a subsequent federal action on the same cause,79 even 
though an inability to obtain appellate review usually defeats issue preclusion.80 
 
3. Hypothetical Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
 
 Finally arriving at the workings of Ruhrgas, we find that most of the work 
is already done. The unchallenged and undecided issue of subject-matter 
jurisdiction turns out to be entitled to the insulation from attack afforded by the 
                                                                                                                                     
with Louisiana to satisfy the federal due process clause requisites for personal jurisdiction”); 
Eaton v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 1978) (“We must agree that the merits 
of the issue of personal jurisdiction over Volkswagen South was decided by the unappealed state 
court judgments and that they bar relitigation of the jurisdictional issue in the instant cases.”). 
 
74See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 71, § 4436, at 156, 171. 
 
75See R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 657 n.10 (2d Cir. 
1979), abrogated on other grounds, Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). But see Roth v. 
McAllister Bros., 316 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 
76See Julie Fukes Stewart, Note, “Litigation Is Not Ping-Pong,” Except When It Is: 
Resolving the Westfall Act’s Circularity Problem, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (2010) (describing 
cases that bounce between removal and remand). 
 
77See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982). 
 
78See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 
79See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 71, § 4436, at 155-56, 164. 
 
80See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982). 
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jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine, if the court acts as if subject-
matter jurisdiction exists. A decided threshold defense turns out to be entitled to 
the preclusive effect afforded by the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction 
doctrine, if the court dismisses on that defense. Now, Ruhrgas’s resequencing 
allows the court to “hypothesize” the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction 
(including Article III justiciability) in order to dismiss on a threshold defense, 
even though someone has challenged subject-matter jurisdiction. As long as no 
other available ground for showing invalidity exists, such as lack of territorial 
jurisdiction or notice,81 and as long as something has not gone haywire, such as 
the prior court plainly lacking subject-matter jurisdiction or the prior judgment 
substantially infringing on the authority of another court or agency,82 this 
hypothetical jurisdiction will supply subject-matter jurisdiction to produce a valid 
judgment for the very limited purpose of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction. 
 
 Admittedly, not everything about Ruhrgas follows without a wisp of 
oddity. By combining two purposefully restricted doctrines—the jurisdiction-to-
determine-jurisdiction doctrine and the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction 
doctrine—Ruhrgas expands them. Although it does not produce a generally valid 
and binding judgment, it produces a judgment that will defeat a second court’s 
jurisdiction if the same jurisdictional issue arises there. That is to say, a judgment 
that decided that some facet of authority was lacking will have this preclusive 
effect—even though subject-matter jurisdiction might have been lacking too. That 
is odd. Yet that oddity was precisely the intended effect of Ruhrgas’s blessing of 
hypothetical jurisdiction. 
 
 Moreover, the resulting doctrine is broader than the name “jurisdiction to 
determine no jurisdiction” implies. It extends beyond jurisdiction to quasi-
jurisdictional decisions and other dismissals for lack of authority, including on 
venue and forum non conveniens grounds.83 For example, if a court faces 
defenses of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and of improper venue, it can skip 
over the former to give a decision that the venue was wrong, which will be 
binding on that narrow point thanks to hypothetical jurisdiction. Ruhrgas thereby 
yields a judgment valid for the very limited purpose of defeating jurisdiction, or 
authority more generally, in any attempt to sue again in a court where the same 
jurisdictional or authority issue arises. 
 
 One could counterargue that Ruhrgas’s holding does not strictly require 
hypothetical jurisdiction. The idea would be that all the Ruhrgas Court did was 
allow dismissal for personal jurisdiction, thus getting the case out of the federal 
                                                 
 
81See supra text accompanying note 45 (explaining that assumed-jurisdiction preclusion 
does not extend to territorial jurisdiction or notice). 
 
82See supra text accompanying note 60 (explaining that assumed-jurisdiction preclusion 
does not extend to every exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction). 
 
83See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 71, § 4436, at 171-79. 
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court but not necessarily giving the personal jurisdiction decision any binding 
effect.84 Yet, no one takes that position.85 The preclusion of hypothetical 
jurisdiction is necessary because otherwise the judgment will mean almost 
nothing: as Justice Ginsburg declared during oral argument, “The Federal court 
would be accomplishing nothing [if it did not] bind the State court.”86 
Additionally, there is the argument that preclusion on the threshold issue is 
required practically to prevent the plaintiff from suing repetitively. Finally, the 
system does not want to discourage the defendant from putting an array of 
threshold defenses before the court, which can then decide the optimal course of 
proceeding.  
 
 Those wary of overbroad preclusion do counterargue that preclusion at the 
least should not broaden from intrasystem necessity to intersystem bindingness, 
so that the plaintiff who cannot sue again in the federal court should be able to sue 
without preclusion in state court.87 The rejoinder here is that the parties and the 
Justices on oral argument in Ruhrgas certainly assumed that intersystem 
preclusion was at stake.88 The Court clearly envisaged intersystem preclusion, just 
as Justice Ginsburg suggested in her opinion for the unanimous Court:  
 
                                                 
 
84Bear in mind that a valid judgment—one that can survive an attack for relief from 
judgment on fundamental grounds such as lack of jurisdiction or notice—enjoys normal res 
judicata effects. Thus, after determination of a forum-authority defense by a valid judgment, the 
normal rules of res judicata apply. For example, if the question of a party’s domicile is actually 
litigated and determined to uphold jurisdiction, and if that question of domicile arises as part of the 
merits of another claim, the prior finding could have issue-preclusive effect. For a quite different 
example, if a defendant loses a post-judgment attack made on the ground of inadequate notice, that 
loss will preclude further attacks on that ground, under the normal doctrine of issue preclusion. 
See, e.g., Arecibo Radio Corp. v. Puerto Rico, 825 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1987). Therefore, if a federal 
court bypassed all threshold issues to dismiss for lack of venue, and a collateral attack on the 
judgment later failed because the second court found that the first court had jurisdiction and gave 
notice, the venue determination would be issue preclusive—without resort to the jurisdiction-to-
determine-jurisdiction doctrine, the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine, or 
hypothetical jurisdiction discussed herein. 
 
85Even the earliest paper, which coined the term “hypothetical jurisdiction,” concluded 
that the resulting judgment must have res judicata effect. See Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction 
Arguendo: The Rationale and Limits of Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712, 730 
n.110 (1979). 
 
86Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 
(1999) (No. 98-470); see supra text accompanying note 64. 
 
87See Ely Todd Chayet, Comment, Hypothetical Jurisdiction and Interjurisdictional 
Preclusion: A “Comity” of Errors, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 99-101 (2000) (suggesting that a federal 
decision based on hypothetical jurisdiction should not preclude state courts); Edney, supra note 
64, at 218, 222 (same). Their argument is that there be no preclusion in state court, not merely that 
there be no preclusion if the state court were to find on collateral attack that federal subject-matter 
was lacking. See id. at 215 n.116. 
 
88Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 8-9, 13, 30-31, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 
U.S. 574 (1999) (No. 98-470). 
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If a federal court dismisses a removed case for want of personal 
jurisdiction, that determination may preclude the parties from relitigating 
the very same personal jurisdiction issue in state court. See Baldwin v. 
Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 524-527 (1931) 
(personal jurisdiction ruling has issue-preclusive effect).89 
 
Moreover, intersystem preclusion is implicit in Ruhrgas’s holding, because 
allowing the Texas state court to reconsider either federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction or the federal courts’ decision on personal jurisdiction would undercut 
the Court’s decision. Reconsideration of subject-matter jurisdiction would forfeit 
the effort saved in skipping a tough question, and the reconsideration would come 
in a state court distant from and unfamiliar with the issue’s intricacies. The state’s 
reconsideration of personal jurisdiction would directly disregard the federal 
court’s determination. Accordingly, under the federal res judicata law applicable 
to a federal judgment, the federal judgment in Ruhrgas’s favor would preclude 
later suit in a Texas state court for lack of personal jurisdiction.90 
 
 The counterarguments will not prevail. In fact, the danger is that courts 
will give too much preclusive effect.91 That danger will only grow in the light of 
Justice Ginsburg’s dicta: 
 
 Issue preclusion in subsequent state-court litigation, however, may 
also attend a federal court’s subject-matter determination. Ruhrgas 
hypothesizes, for example, a defendant who removes on diversity grounds 
a state-court suit seeking $50,000 in compensatory and $1 million in 
punitive damages for breach of contract. . . . If the district court 
determines that state law does not allow punitive damages for breach of 
contract and therefore remands the removed action for failure to satisfy the 
amount in controversy, . . . the federal court’s conclusion will travel back 
with the case. Assuming a fair airing of the issue in federal court, that 
court’s ruling on permissible state-law damages may bind the parties in 
state court, although it will set no precedent otherwise governing state-
court adjudications. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State 
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940) (“[Federal courts’] determinations of 
[whether they have jurisdiction to entertain a case] may not be assailed 
collaterally.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12, p. 115 (1980) 
                                                 
 
89Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999). 
 
90See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 71, § 4436, at 168 & n.33; Idleman, supra note 21, 
at 29; David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade: Some Thoughts About Her 
Contributions in the Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 30 (2004).  
 
91See, e.g., Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1206 
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an issue decided in a personal jurisdiction dismissal—“whether 
Applebee’s assumed or represented that it would assume Casual Dining’s purchase agreement 
with Matosantos”—was preclusive on the merits in a second suit). 
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(“When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the 
judgment [ordinarily] precludes the parties from litigating the question of 
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation.”).92 
 
But Justice Ginsburg had just swallowed this example whole, when offered it by 
Charles Alan Wright during his oral argument for the petitioner.93 The support she 
offers is completely irrelevant, as Chicot and the Restatement deal only with 
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction cutting off collateral attack and not with 
collateral estoppel. Not surprisingly, then, her result, even if hedged, is wrong.94 
 
 No reason exists to give decisions based on hypothetical jurisdiction more 
preclusive effect than what is appropriate under jurisdiction to determine no 
jurisdiction.95 Again, the many good reasons for strictly limiting res judicata 
effects include the idea that limited jurisdiction should yield limited effects, 
especially when the court has skipped over decision on subject-matter 
jurisdiction. The truncated procedure for deciding forum-authority issues counsels 
against carrying such determinations over to affect the merits. Therefore, the 
preclusive effect in this context should work only to defeat any attempt to resue in 
a second court where the same authority issue arises, thus not extending beyond 
the precise issue of authority that the first court decided.  
 
4. Resequenceable Grounds 
 
 The question remains of which grounds can leapfrog ahead of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Resequencing even of the merits, although presumably 
without the interplay of hypothetical jurisdiction, had become popular in the 
lower courts by the 1990s.96 That movement generated the reaction that was the 
Steel Co. case.97 But a certain amount of resequencing had in fact been popular 
even in Supreme Court,98 as Steel Co. acknowledged.99 After Steel Co., the 
                                                 
 
92Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1999). 
 
93Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 
(1999) (No. 98-470). 
 
94See supra note 68 (collecting cases); Idleman, supra note 21, at 29-30 (arguing also that 
Ginsburg’s example invokes law of the case rather than res judicata); Edney, supra note 64, at 
201-02. 
 
95See supra text accompanying notes 65-78. 
 
96See, e.g., United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 474 (3d Cir. 1997) (calling hypothetical 
jurisdiction to reach the merits a “settled principle”). 
 
97See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998). 
 
98See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997) (treating class 
certification as resequenceable); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66-67 
(1997) (mootness); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975) (abstention), discussed in Idleman, supra 
note 21, at 91 & n.512; Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (discretionary 
supplemental jurisdiction); Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970) 
(exhaustion). 
 
99See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 100 n.3 (1998). 
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Supreme Court expanded the list of resequenceable grounds.100 Meanwhile, the 
lower courts resumed expanding that list too, to reach many relatively low-level 
inquiries.101 
 
 “There is an array of non-merits questions” that federal courts may 
resequence today, as the D.C. Circuit summed it up nicely once again.102 In Tenet 
v. Doe, the Supreme Court tried to generalize when it allowed resequencing of a 
ground “designed not merely to defeat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial 
inquiry.”103 
 
 Then in Sinochem, the Court more clearly drew the outer line as lying 
between “nonmerits” and “merits” grounds: 
 
Dismissal short of reaching the merits means that the court will not 
“proceed at all” to an adjudication of the cause. . . . The principle 
underlying these decisions was well stated by the Seventh Circuit: 
“[J]urisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the 
merits.”104 
 
Thus, “when considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so 
warrant,”105 a court can decide “a threshold, nonmerits issue”106 like forum non 
conveniens before subject-matter jurisdiction. But then, almost as if to 
demonstrate the lack of clarity of the Court’s chosen dividing line, Justice 
Ginsburg qualified: “We therefore need not decide whether a court conditioning a 
forum non conveniens dismissal on the waiver of jurisdictional or limitations 
defenses in the foreign forum must first determine its own authority to adjudicate 
the case.”107 What Sinochem ultimately means, then, is that there is still plenty of 
room for arguing about the extent of the list of resequenceable grounds. 
                                                 
 
100Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (dictum) 
(treating forum non conveniens as resequenceable); Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 
(2004) (third-party standing); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005) (Totten doctrine, which prohibits 
actions against the government based on covert espionage agreements); Elk Grove Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (prudential standing); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 
815, 831 (1999) (class certification, viewed as a matter of statutory standing); Ruhrgas AG v. 
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (personal jurisdiction).  
 
101See, e.g., In re LimitNone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2008) (transfer of venue); In re 
Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (forum non conveniens). 
 
102Galvan v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (treating 
federal sovereign immunity as resequenceable). 
 
103544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005) (dismissing on the basis of a rule prohibiting actions against 
the government based on covert espionage agreements). 
 
104Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting 
Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 
105Id. at 432. 
 
106Id. at 433. 
 
107Id. at 435. 
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 Matters of sovereign immunity generate hot dispute in this respect.108 
Does the act-of-state defense come within the fold of threshold, nonmerits 
defenses?109 Is qualified immunity a resequenceable matter?110 One is tempted to 
say at least that defenses like res judicata or the statute of limitations are too much 
on the merits to resequence. But then one confronts the argument that even the 
merits should be resequenceable if the merits and jurisdiction intertwine.111 
Where is the line, if one exists at all? 
 
 One might think that no line will ever hold, that there is no logical 
stopping point in the expansion of the list of resequenceable grounds since the 
Steel Co. decision. But if the list were to expand into the merits, the Steel Co. rule 
would promptly unravel. We would be back where we started: a court could 
decide issues in any sequence, although the resulting judgment would be exposed 
to the normal avenues for relief from judgment, including collateral attack on 
subject-matter jurisdiction grounds. The nonbypassability rule would disappear, 
and hypothetical jurisdiction would no longer operate.112 
                                                 
 
108See Idleman, supra note 21, at 81-89 (discussing both the Eleventh Amendment and 
federal sovereign immunity); cf. id. at 95-97 (discussing bypassability); Hien Ngoc Nguyen, 
Comment, Under Construction: Fairness, Waiver, and Hypothetical Eleventh Amendment 
Jurisdiction, 93 CAL. L. REV. 587 (2005) (same). The defense of domestic sovereign immunity is 
tricky because some see it as jurisdictional, while others see it as quasi-jurisdictional, in various 
contexts. But as I shall argue, the key question is whether a decision on such a ground will bar a 
new action, not some other question like whether the defendant can get relief from a default 
judgment on such a ground. Compare Galvan v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (treating federal sovereign immunity as resequenceable), with Calderon v. 
Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998) (suggesting that subject matter-jurisdiction must come before 
Eleventh Amendment). 
 Foreign sovereign immunity may be different, because more people see it in more 
contexts as partly a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. 
RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 66-72 (4th ed. 2007); 
cf. Kao Hwa Shipping Co. v. China Steel Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (allowing 
relief from default judgment on the ground of foreign sovereign immunity). Thus, it could be 
nonbypassable and yet not resequenceable. 
 
109See Rutledge, supra note 4, at 44-46 (arguing, against precedent, that the law should 
change to bring this defense into the resequenceable group, because not doing so gives settlement 
leverage to plaintiffs, increases judicial investment of resources, and retards development of legal 
glosses on the defense). 
 
110See ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAUREN K. ROBEL & DAVID R. STRAS, FEDERAL COURTS 
540-41 (2d ed. 2009) (posing the question). 
 
111See Long Term Care Partners, LLC v. United States., 516 F.3d 225, 232-33 (4th Cir. 
2008); Joshua Schwartz, Note, Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a Broader “Arising Under” 
Jurisdictional Question, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (2004) (arguing that dismissal for lack of a 
federal cause of action should be deemed quasi-jurisdictional and hence resequenceable). 
 
112See supra note 84 (explaining how validity works in the absence of hypothetical 
jurisdiction). Of course, the system could alternatively take the radical step of removing subject-
matter jurisdiction as a requirement for a valid judgment. See Moore, supra note 60; Note, supra 
note 48. 
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 In other words, if Steel Co. calls for an ever-expanding list, then Steel Co. 
carries the seeds of its own destruction,113 much like the fate of other sequencing 
rules.114 Therefore, a line must be drawn: as long as the Court wants to allow 
federal courts to skip subject-matter jurisdiction purposefully for easier and surer 
decision with binding effect on certain threshold matters, it must not extend the 
permission to decisions on the merits. 
 
 True, Chicot stands for the proposition that a court without subject-matter 
jurisdiction can give a binding decision on the merits, as long as the court thought 
it had subject-matter jurisdiction or the parties failed to raise subject-matter 
jurisdiction.115 But, as Steel Co. necessarily said, a court cannot purposefully skip 
subject-matter jurisdiction to dismiss on the merits. In that sense, the case’s 
nonbypassability rule represents a limit on Chicot, just as it was the price for 
approving hypothetical jurisdiction.116 Moreover, Steel Co. was a rejection of the 
alternative route of allowing the court to dismiss on the merits but giving the 
decision no preclusive effect at all.117 In effect, Steel Co., as elaborated by 
Ruhrgas, was a compromise between those two views: making hypothetical 
jurisdiction too widely available in support of preclusion after the judge 
discretionarily sequences the defenses or prohibiting hypothetical jurisdiction 
altogether. 
 
 Therein lies the key to understanding resequenceability. The compromise 
allows hypothetical jurisdiction only for dismissal on nonmerits grounds, giving 
that dismissal the strictly circumscribed preclusive effect prescribed for the 
jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine. To get rid of the case at the 
threshold in a way that precludes only the threshold issue, so allowing the plaintiff 
to correct the threshold defect in a second suit, is desirable. By contrast, there is 
no reason to allow exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction in a way that precludes the 
merits, especially in the possible absence of subject-matter jurisdiction. Moreover, 
                                                 
 
113See Friedenthal, supra note 28, at 270-75; Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of 
Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1614, 1631 (2003) (arguing that “there is no hard conceptual 
difference between jurisdiction and the merits” and “when faced with the truly extraordinary case, 
the lower federal court judge knows that he or she can rule on the merits in the absence of 
jurisdiction”); Viavant, supra note 40, at 571-72; cf. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 971 (2009) (detailing other difficulties of the “jurisdiction” term); Jay Tidmarsh, 
Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 409-13 (2010) (detailing other 
difficulties of the “merits” term). 
 
114See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (undercutting the former 
sequencing rule of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (treating qualified immunity)). 
 
115See supra text accompanying notes 44 & 59 (explaining the Chicot doctrine). 
 
116See supra text accompanying notes 44-50 (explaining the rationale of the 
nonbypassability list).  
 
117See supra text accompanying notes 84-86 (explaining the unsatisfactoriness of this 
route).  
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it would not be feasible to give a strictly circumscribed preclusive effect to a 
decision on the merits, because if it gets any preclusive effect it will kill the cause 
of action. 
 
 The rule that emerges is not a compromise made only for the sake of 
compromise. It is a rule that makes good policy sense. It gives the judge a zone of 
freedom of action at the threshold. Yet it tells the judge that to dispose of a claim 
in a preclusive way on the merits, the judge has first to make sure that the 
jurisdictional ducks are in a row. Otherwise, hypothetical subject-matter 
jurisdiction will be unavailable to insulate the judgment from later attack. 
 
 With the contours of that Steel Co.-Ruhrgas compromise finally 
understood, the decisional grounds for which a court may purposefully skip over a 
challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction become apparent. The length of the list 
should not turn on some abstract notion like “essentiality” to the judicial 
process.118 Instead, the law should draw the line in practical terms, by looking to 
when a court possibly lacking subject-matter jurisdiction should be able to give a 
binding decision on a defense. It should not be able to act when the effect is to kill 
the cause of action, but only when the plaintiff has a chance to avoid or correct 
the defect. Well, the law already specifies when a plaintiff normally can start over 
after a contested dismissal. Accordingly, resequenceability should look to the line 
that res judicata already draws, with fair clarity, when it declines to create a bar to 
reassertion of the claim after an adjudication “not on the merits.”119 Thus, the list 
of resequenceable items should include only those defenses that would result in 
dismissals not on the merits in the claim-preclusive sense.120 
                                                 
 
118But see Idleman, supra note 21, at 12-13. 
 
119ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS 
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 98-99 (2001): 
 Certain dismissals not on the merits remain exceptions to the rule of bar, 
namely: (1) dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or territorial jurisdiction, 
improper venue, inadequate notice, or nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties; (2) most 
dismissals for prematurity of suit or failure to satisfy a precondition to suit; and (3) most 
voluntary dismissals. Moreover, unless prohibited by statute or rule, the court in the first 
action can specify that its dismissal is not to act as a bar; and the court in the second 
action will defer to that specification. 
 Other dismissals and judgments, which are perhaps not in any real sense on the 
merits but which were preceded by an ample opportunity for plaintiff to litigate the claim, 
have of late come within the rule of bar, at least in the view of many courts and 
legislatures. Examples include: (1) a dismissal for failure to state a claim; (2) a summary 
judgment, judgment on partial findings, or judgment as a matter of law and other 
decisions squarely on the merits; and (3) a dismissal for failure to prosecute or to obey a 
court order or rule, even though it is not in any real sense on the merits. 
 
120A dismissal for failure to prosecute or to obey a court order or rule might have 
presented a special problem for this formulation, had not the Court already solved it in Willy v. 
Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992) (upholding imposition of FED. R, CIV. P. 11 sanctions even in 
a case dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). Thus, a court can proceed directly to a 
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 On the one hand, the settled Steel Co.-Ruhrgas line of precedent—which 
lists justiciability, jurisdiction, abstention, exhaustion, class certification, and 
venue as resequenceable grounds—conforms to this test. Dismissals on such 
grounds do not create a bar to a new action when the plaintiff avoids or corrects 
the defect.121  
 
 On the other hand, the disputed matters of sovereign immunity, act of 
state, and qualified immunity should not be resequenceable: to bypass subject-
matter jurisdiction and give a preclusive decision on such a defense kills the cause 
of action on the merits, as opposed to merely deciding some threshold issue that 
normally does not create a bar.122 Likewise, the intuition that the other defenses 
are not resequenceable seems sound: res judicata123 and even the statute of 
limitations124 are sufficiently on the merits in a claim-preclusive sense. Finally, 
the jurisdiction/merits divider persists in the law of claim preclusion: a dismissal 
for lack of jurisdiction is not treated as being on the merits, no matter how 
intertwined with the merits it might be, while a dismissal for failure to state a 
claim is now treated as being on the merits.125 Although there may be very good 
policy reasons to reach some of these issues early,126 there is no reason to extend 
hypothetical subject-matter jurisdiction to them. An important insight is that one 
should not compose the list with the policies of efficient sequencing in mind, but 
instead with a focus on when we wish to extend a preclusive effect to the decided 
defense even in the possible absence of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 
 
 In sum, and as suggested at the outset, the list of resequenceable threshold 
matters is not the same as, and is in fact much longer than, the list of fundamental 
matters that a federal court cannot bypass. With the logic behind resequencing 
exposed, I am much more comfortable in specifying the two lists: 
                                                                                                                                     
disciplinary dismissal, which then will have normal res judicata effects because subject-matter 
jurisdiction for discipline exists. 
 
121See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982). 
 
122See id. § 19. 
 
123See Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 138-40 (3d Cir. 1947); Bronstein v. 
Kalcheim, 467 N.E.2d 979 (Ill. App. 1984). 
 
124See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 119, at 93-96. 
 
125See supra note 51 (discussing the jurisdiction/merits divider in the similar, but not 
necessarily identical, context of validity). 
 
126See, e.g., supra note 109 (discussing act of state). 
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Nonbypassable Defenses 
i.e., defenses the court cannot skip 
over to dismiss on the merits 
Resequenceable Defenses 
i.e., defenses on which the court can 
dismiss without first deciding 
nonbypassable defenses 
Article III justiciability;  
subject-matter jurisdiction 
other justiciability and jurisdiction; 
abstention; exhaustion; class 
certification; venue; anything else not 
on the merits in the claim-preclusive 
sense 
 
5. Discretion to Resequence 
 
 Once the court decides that an asserted defense is resequenceable, then the 
court must decide whether to decide it first. Normally, the court will still decide 
subject-matter jurisdiction first in light of Steel Co., but Ruhrgas frees the court to 
decide the other defense if that path is easier or surer or if that path serves other 
institutional interests.127 But that discretion is not my concern in this Part. Here I 
am interested in a rule that forbids sequencing in the court’s discretion, and 
incidentally how uncertainty about the scope of the rule might affect the exercise 
of that discretion. 
 
C. Summary 
 
 Today, upon a challenge to Article III justiciability or subject-matter 
jurisdiction, a federal court cannot avoid the challenge by dismissing on the 
merits, but the court may invoke hypothetical jurisdiction to dismiss on any 
nonmerits defense with preclusive effect as to that defense. In other words, the 
court should normally decide defenses of subject-matter jurisdiction at the outset 
of the case. Such a fundamental matters is nonbypassable. But if the defendant 
challenges the existence of some other threshold jurisdiction-like requirement, the 
court has discretion to act as if it has subject-matter jurisdiction and dismiss on 
the basis of that other defect. Thus, relying on hypothetical jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, the court can resequence to render a binding determination on the 
lack of, say, personal jurisdiction or forum non conveniens. 
 
 Nonbypassability has obvious sequencing implications for judicial 
decisionmaking, because courts must decide in a certain order under that regime. 
It is indeed the law’s foremost limitation on the courts’ power to sequence. But 
upon close examination, the nonbypassability rule proves to be quite narrow, and 
                                                 
 
127See Idleman, supra note 21, at 14-20. 
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the exception of resequenceability quite broad. Thus, this foremost sequencing 
limitation turns out not to be a major constraint, except perhaps by its lack of 
clarity. 
 
 To the extent that courts are uncertain of the reach of the nonbypassability 
rule, but wish to avoid reversal, they will follow it even when it does not apply. 
Likewise, courts might be uncertain as to the list of resequenceable grounds or as 
to the workings of hypothetical jurisdiction. The result will be an unwillingness to 
avoid jurisdictional questions. 
 
 Steel Co.-Ruhrgas is a good doctrine, when properly limited. To the extent 
that confusion creates a broader constraint, the constraint is undesirable. The 
above-given attention to the precise meaning of the doctrine worked well to 
reduce the current fog. Ideally, the doctrine should prove, in future actual practice, 
to be a fairly minimal constraint on courts’ sequencing power. 
 
III. INTRASUIT PRECLUSION 
 
A. Jury-Judge Sequencing 
 
 The middle of the last century saw a series of famous cases by which the 
Supreme Court reconciled the merger of law and equity with the Seventh 
Amendment, and through which the Court greatly expanded the scope of the jury 
right.128 In the process, the Court created a sequencing rule under which a federal 
court129 must give first to the jury a factual issue common to the merits of a law 
claim and an equity claim joined in the same case. Given all those conditions, to 
say nothing of the rarity of trial,130 this rule has only occasional application. 
 
1. Cases 
                                                 
 
128See generally RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, 
MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1495-527 (10th ed. 2010); 9 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302.1 (3d ed. 
2008). 
 
129Although the Supreme Court has held most of the rights in the Bill of Rights to be 
fundamental enough for the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee against invasion by the states, 
the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury has not been one of those. See, e.g., Walker v. 
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La.), aff’d mem. 
sub nom. Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972), Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1973). That is to 
say, the Seventh Amendment applies to actions in the federal courts, but not to state-court actions. 
But cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010) (throwing the old 
cases into doubt and opening the door slightly to incorporating the Seventh Amendment). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Seventh Amendment has had little persuasive 
influence on state courts. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 128, at 1510-11. 
 
130See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 
1956-61 (2009) (showing that the trial rate has dropped nearly to 1% of filed federal cases). 
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 Beacon Theatres131 was the first of those cases. It involved a dispute 
between movie theaters over the right to show movies exclusively in the 
competitive area, for a time period specified in a contractual “clearance.” In 
essence, Fox sued Beacon in equity for an injunction, and Beacon counterclaimed 
at law for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The two claims had a common 
issue concerning whether the Fox and Beacon theaters were in competition even 
though more than ten miles apart. Beacon wanted a jury trial. As a historical 
matter, an equity court had discretion whether to proceed in these circumstances 
or to defer to the later-commenced law action on the thought that the legal remedy 
was adequate.132 Accordingly, the district court chose to decide the equity claim 
first, without a jury, and the court of appeals assented. The Supreme Court 
reversed. 
 
 First, the Court’s all-important premise133 was that whichever 
determination on the common issue came first—be it by judge or by jury—would 
preclude the second determination: 
 
Thus the effect of the action of the District Court could be, as the Court of 
Appeals believed, “to limit the petitioner’s opportunity fully to try to a 
jury every issue which has a bearing upon its treble damage suit,” for 
determination of the issue of clearances by the judge might “operate either 
by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude both parties 
with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble damage claim.”134 
 
The Court in fact cited nothing for its res judicata point. But as to preclusion 
between law and equity, the Court was right, as to now135 and 1791.136 Because 
the old courts administered law and equity in separate suits, they applied 
preclusion between them according to the ordinary rules of res judicata. 
                                                 
 
131Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
 
132See American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937); FIELD ET AL., supra note 
128, at 1493-95. 
 
133See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 334 (1979); David L. Shapiro & 
Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 442, 446 (1971). 
 
134Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959). The Supreme Court was 
quoting the court of appeals, which actually had said: “Petitioner is correct in saying that if this 
issue be first tried and determined by the court in its proposed first trial the determination of that 
issue by the court will operate either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude 
both parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble damage claim.” Beacon 
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 1958). The court of appeals had cited 
Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1946), for this proposition, but nevertheless held 
that the district judge could discretionarily try the equitable claim first. 
 
135See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 334 (1979); Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 
148 (1899); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 cmt. j (1942). 
 
136See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 133, at 450-54. 
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 Second, the Court reasoned that to circumvent preclusion, the trial judge 
could invoke his or her sequencing discretion. The judge should exercise such 
discretion in the light of current procedural realities—“not by precedents decided 
under discarded procedures, but in the light of the remedies now made 
available.”137 In a merged system, the legal remedy, because it no longer required 
a separate action, had become an adequate remedy. Equity could await the trial of 
the common law claim. The judge could try the issue first to the jury without any 
disadvantage to the parties. 
 
 Third, the Court ruled that preclusion of a jury by a prior determination in 
the same suit would normally violate the Seventh Amendment.138 Therefore, the 
judge now must proceed in the order of jury decision on the common issue 
coming first. Note that the Court did not fashion a general principle that the jury 
must go first on common issues. Instead, it ruled that a court cannot conduct a 
single suit in a way that would defeat the jury right. Accordingly, its holding 
applies only when intrasuit preclusion is actually in play. 
 
 The Court’s three-step reasoning is obscure for modern minds. It bears 
repeating that the Court saw its task as being to preserve the jury right in an 
altered procedural system. It thought that res judicata would apply in a single suit 
if, and only if, the parties would have brought separate suits in 1791: in those 
circumstances, an earlier jury determination would bind the judge, just as an 
earlier judge determination would bind the jury. The Court manipulated history, 
without disregarding it, by finding equity to have possessed discretion in the old 
days and merely directing how modern chancellors should exercise it. The 
Seventh Amendment, because it favored the jury trial right over the judge trial 
right, requires modern courts to use their new procedural discretion in a way to 
avoid that preclusion of the jury. However, the Court did hedge a bit:  
 
 If there should be cases where the availability of declaratory 
judgment or joinder in one suit of legal and equitable causes would not in 
all respects protect the plaintiff seeking equitable relief from irreparable 
harm while affording a jury trial in the legal cause, the trial court will 
necessarily have to use its discretion in deciding whether the legal or 
equitable cause should be tried first. Since the right to jury trial is a 
constitutional one, however, while no similar requirement protects trials 
by the court, that discretion is very narrowly limited and must, wherever 
possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial. . . . This long-standing 
principle of equity dictates that only under the most imperative 
                                                 
 
137Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959). 
 
138See id. at 511 (prohibiting that “the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through 
prior determination”). 
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circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of 
the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of 
legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.139 
 
 These hesitancies evaporated three years later when the Court, again by 
Justice Black, decided Dairy Queen.140 There the plaintiff had joined equitable 
and legal claims for relief. The defendant wanted a jury trial. As a historical 
matter, an equity court had no discretion as to the common issues, because the 
plaintiff could have denied the defendant a jury right on them by suing initially in 
equity only.141 Accordingly, the district court denied the request for a jury, and the 
court of appeals assented. But again the Supreme Court reversed. 
 
 With a strong pro-jury bias, the Court simply lifted the holding of Beacon 
Theatres and applied it without regard to its context. The Dairy Queen Court said 
that “in a case such as this where there cannot even be a contention of such 
‘imperative circumstances,’ Beacon Theatres requires that any legal issues for 
which a trial by jury is timely and properly demanded be submitted to a jury.”142 
It therefore closed:  
 
 We conclude therefore that the district judge erred in refusing to 
grant petitioner’s demand for a trial by jury on the factual issues related to 
the question of whether there has been a breach of contract. Since these 
issues are common with those upon which respondents’ claim to equitable 
relief is based, the legal claims involved in the action must be determined 
prior to any final court determination of respondents’ equitable claims.143 
 
 With Beacon Theatres cut free of its moorings in reason, virtually no 
subsequent cases have found imperative circumstances to avoid applying its 
rule.144 The rule applies without regard to historical restrictions or current 
circumstances. Even if the trial court dismisses the legal claim for relief joined by 
the plaintiff with an equitable claim for relief and if the court then tries the 
equitable claim without the jury requested by the plaintiff, the same rule applies: 
                                                 
 
139Id. at 510-11(footnotes omitted); see John C. McCoid, II, Procedural Reform and the 
Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1967). 
 
140Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
 
141See FIELD ET AL., supra note 128, at 1490; FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. 
HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 515-20 (5th ed. 2001). 
 
142Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 (1962). 
 
143Id. at 479. 
 
144See Cabinet Vision v. Cabnetware, 129 F.3d 595, 600 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Accordingly, 
whatever discretion exists to override a jury’s fact finding in such situations, this discretion is 
reviewed carefully.”); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 128, § 2338, at 370 (concluding that it is 
“highly doubtful that there are any circumstances that would qualify”). But see Western 
Geophysical Co. of Am. v. Bolt Assocs., Inc., 440 F.2d 765, 772 (2d Cir. 1971); Holiday Inns of 
Am., Inc. v. Lussi, 42 F.R.D. 27, 32 (N.D.N.Y. 1967). 
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when the appellate court finds the dismissal to have been in error, the trial court 
must retry the common issues to a jury first.145 
 
2. Consequences 
 
 As one consequence, today the strict sequencing rule is that a federal 
court must, upon request for a jury, first try to the jury any issue common to 
joined legal and equitable claims for relief.146 The joinder could be by the 
plaintiff joining multiple claims for relief, or by the defendant asserting a defense 
or counterclaim that could in the old days have stood as a separate claim. As 
another consequence, the jury’s decision will bind the judge on the common 
issue.147 
 
 Where does this preclusion rule come from? It does not come from res 
judicata, which applies only between separate suits,148 as all the hornbooks say.149 
It rests solely on the Seventh Amendment’s historical approach:150 because in 
                                                 
 
145See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 551-54 (1990). 
 
146See Shum v. Intel, 499 F.3d 1272, 1276-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007); LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH 
U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 886-87 (3d ed. 2004); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 128, § 
2305, at 125 & n.21, § 2338, at 368 & n.10. 
 
147See International Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Techs. Can., Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 735, 
738 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc. 138 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir.) (“the jury's 
finding on an issue common to both claims is in any event conclusive”), vacated on other 
grounds, 525 U.S. 802 (1998); Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 108 F.3d 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(“As our sister circuits have uniformly held in cases involving allegations of intentional 
discrimination, the district court must therefore follow the jury’s factual findings with respect to a 
plaintiff’s legal claims when later ruling on claims for equitable relief.”), on rehearing, 139 F.3d 
958 (D.C. Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 526 (1999); JAMES ET AL., supra note 
141, at 528. 
 
148See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 1 (1982). FIELD ET AL., supra 
note 128, at 688, explains: 
The doctrine of res judicata specifies certain binding effects, in subsequent litigation, of a 
previously rendered judgment. Generally speaking, then, res judicata can apply only 
when an attempt is made in a second action to foreclose relitigation of a matter already 
adjudicated in a previous action. Res judicata therefore has no application to an attempt 
in the original action at correcting error in the judgment, as by motion for a new trial or 
by appeal. 
 
149See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 119, at 7-8; JAMES ET AL., supra note 141, at 677; 
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 146, at 944-45. 
 
150Such preclusion outside the traditional confines of res judicata is not unique. Another 
special kind of preclusion can apply within the same suit: jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction 
applies to preclude a direct attack on validity by a motion for relief from judgment. See, e.g., 
Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 64-66 (2d Cir. 1992) (involving FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)). The 
special doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction springs from sources different from those 
of claim and issue preclusion. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 Other preclusion-related rules might stem from the Seventh Amendment. Some courts 
have posited that in a bifurcated trial, the second jury cannot reconsider the first jury’s finding 
without violating the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment. See Castano v. 
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1791 the legal and equitable claims would have been separate suits, we should 
apply intrasuit preclusion between jury and judge in order to preserve the jury 
right as it was. Therefore, being an aspect of jury right, and not part of res 
judicata, this special kind of jury-judge preclusion has no broader application than 
factual issues common to joined legal and equitable claims. 
 
 Where does that sequencing rule come from? It follows from the premise 
of the Seventh Amendment’s special preclusion law. Therefore, it too has no 
broader application than factual issues common to joined legal and equitable 
claims. 
 
 Of course, one could say that the jury precedents will come to apply 
without any regard to their reasoning, much as Dairy Queen extended Beacon 
Theatres. But that outcome is unlikely now that the jury mania of the 1960s has 
passed.151 Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen was a product of its time, and now the 
Court would probably not adopt it as a matter of first impression. We accordingly 
need to excavate the Court’s train of reasoning, and respect its inherent restraining 
force.  
 
 This restrained view of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen helps to explain the 
later Parklane Hosiery.152 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a prior 
equitable decree could preclude the defendant in a subsequent law action brought 
by a new plaintiff. On the one hand, this result is consistent with the law of res 
judicata, which allows equity-law preclusion.153 It is indeed consistent with the 
views that res judicata adjusts to any procedural changes and that expanding res 
judicata can apply in new situations despite old procedural limitations. Just as 
merged procedure caused claim preclusion to extend to plaintiffs who sue on 
either the legal or the equitable part of a claim without the other part,154 
nonmutual collateral estoppel could leap the equity/law divide to defeat a jury 
right vis-à-vis a new plaintiff. On the other hand, the result is also consistent with 
the jury-judge sequencing rule. Because that rule rests on the Seventh 
Amendment’s dictate in a single suit that the judge use existing sequencing power 
                                                                                                                                     
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 751 (5th Cir. 1996); Lucas Watkins, How States Can Protect 
Their Policies in Federal Class Actions, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 285, 307-08 (2010); cf. 7B 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1801, at 272-73 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing analogous partial-certification problem). 
But see Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of 
Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 5, 41-49), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578459. These courts conclude that to protect the jury right in the 
second phase, the issues in the two phases need to be distinct and separable. See Cimino v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 320 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 
151See FIELD ET AL., supra note 128, at 1525-27. 
 
152Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 
153See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 
154See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. i (1982). 
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to preserve the jury right, it has no application to the Parklane situation of 
separate lawsuits for which sequencing is not a possibility.155 The Supreme Court 
could have invented a wholly new rule of res judicata that provided for no 
preclusion at the expense of the jury right in any setting whatsoever, but the pro-
jury motivation to invent had waned. 
 
 Nevertheless, this view of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen is not only 
restrained but also subtle. Lower courts can misunderstand it and, at least within a 
single suit, think that the jury-judge sequencing rule applies more broadly than it 
should. 
 
 The prime example of confusion involves issues common to jurisdiction 
and the merits. Although there is no constitutional jury right on jurisdictional 
issues,156 courts and commentators equivocate on whether a jury must first 
determine any common issue.157 They are wrong to equivocate. Beacon Theatres-
Dairy Queen applies only to issues common to joined legal and equitable claims, 
not to issues common to jurisdiction and the merits. The reason is that the 
preclusion premise of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen rested on preclusion 
between separate law and equity suits. Preclusion never extended to decisions on 
jurisdiction precluding later consideration of the merits in the same suit.158 
Because there would be no preclusion, there is no need to invert matters by a 
sequencing that would have the merits considered by a jury before the judge could 
decide the common issue involved in the dispute over jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
judge can decide jurisdiction at the outset, and the jury can decide anew the 
common issue at the regular trial. 
 
B. Foreclosure 
 
 Concern about preclusion in violation of the Seventh Amendment 
generated Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen. But as shown above, its sequencing rule 
                                                 
 
155See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 551-54 (1990). 
 
156See Note, Trial by Jury of Preliminary Jurisdictional Facts in Federal Courts, 48 
IOWA L. REV. 471 (1963) (arguing that jurisdiction is an issue collateral to the merits, and so no 
jury right exists); Steven Kessler, Note, The Right to a Jury Trial for Jurisdictional Issues, 6 
CARDOZO L. REV. 149 (1984); cf. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2003) (“the decision to label an issue ‘law’ or ‘fact’ is 
a functional one based on who should decide it under what standard, and is not based on the nature 
of the issue”). 
 
157See, e.g., Friedman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 181 F. Supp. 327, 329 (W.D. 
Pa. 1960) (saying there is a jury right “where the jurisdictional question of joint venture is closely 
tied to the merits”); Note, supra note 156, at 480-81, 489; Kessler, supra note 156, at 165-66. 
 
158Some statutes expressly so provide. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 735, § 5/2-301(b) (2005); 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(2); cf. Clermont, supra note 17, at 990-91 (arguing additionally against 
preclusion because the standard of proof for jurisdiction is less demanding than the standard 
applicable to the merits). 
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does not extend beyond the narrow context of factual issues common to joined 
legal and equitable claims. The question now becomes whether other concerns 
about foreclosure later in the same suit have generated sequencing rules 
applicable in other contexts.  
 
1. Res Judicata 
 
 Here the answer is fairly simple. No further sequencing rules arise from 
concerns about actual preclusion in the same suit. The reason is that there is no 
intrasuit res judicata (as opposed to some separate doctrine such as Beacon 
Theatres-Dairy Queen).159 
 
 The cases conform to that view. Besides jurisdiction, judges must decide 
other preliminary matters that overlap matters destined later to go before the 
ultimate decisionmaker. For example, some evidential rulings involve issues 
common with the merits: 
 
Consider the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule as it operates in 
a criminal conspiracy case. To establish that a hearsay exception applies 
the proponent of evidence must, by a preponderance of the evidence, show 
that the prerequisites for the exception have been established. . . . But if 
the substantive charge is conspiracy, that means that the court must in 
effect find that the defendant is guilty of conspiracy (by a preponderance 
of the evidence) before admitting this evidence which the jury must 
evaluate, along with all the other evidence, in determining whether 
defendant has been proved guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The judge does not, of course, tell the jury that she has already 
concluded that defendant is guilty, albeit only by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and defendant's right to a jury trial is preserved.160 
 
Therefore, no corrective sequencing rule for evidential rulings is necessary. 
 
 More exotic rulings include Pavey v. Conley,161 where the Seventh Circuit 
faced a situation in which the same factual issue, the severity of injury, was 
germane both to the preliminary inquiry of whether the prisoner had exhausted his 
administrative remedies and also to the merits of the case. The district court had 
held that the prisoner possessed a jury trial right on any factual issues relating to 
whether he had exhausted the administrative remedies, and so delayed 
determination of the defense until trial. The court of appeals ruled that the judge 
                                                 
 
159See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 
160See Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the 
Merits on Class Certification, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 61). 
 
161544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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should rule on exhaustion and do so at the outset, but that the ultimate factfinder 
could revisit the judge’s determination: “if there is a jury trial, the jury will make 
all necessary findings of fact without being bound by (or even informed of) any of 
the findings made by the district judge in determining that the prisoner had 
exhausted his administrative remedies.”162 
 
  The most common setting in which courts overtly discuss this problem is 
class certification. By now it should be clear how the Hydrogen Peroxide case 
could say: “Although the district court’s findings for the purpose of class 
certification are conclusive on that topic, they do not bind the fact-finder on the 
merits.”163 All the cases on point seem to say the same.164 
 
 Against all the case law, one could argue that because class actions were 
equitable in origin, and that only equity could entertain a class action even when 
its merits were all legal,165 we have fallen back into the context of issues common 
to joined legal and equitable claims.166 But the class-action situation is different 
from joinder of legal and equitable claims. Although class actions were originally 
all equitable, the Supreme Court has ruled that the jury right will be determined 
separately for certification and for the merits: the former remains equitable, with 
decision by the judge, while the latter might be “legal,” with a jury right.167 The 
certification and the merits nonetheless have always been part of one case, not to 
be pursued in separate law and equity suits, and hence with no room for the 
application of res judicata between the class action’s equitable and legal parts. 
With the Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen premise of preclusion therefore not 
kicking in, there is no sequencing conclusion. The court can decide the 
certification issues first, and the ultimate factfinder, be it judge or jury, will be 
free to reconsider any common issues. 
 
 Alternatively, opponents of the case law on class certification could argue 
that the denial of preclusion is inefficient or even unfair. The idea is that the court 
should not have to try the same question twice, and the victorious party should not 
                                                 
 
162Id. at 742. 
 
163In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
164See id. at 318 n.19; In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“not binding on the trier of facts, even if that trier is the class certification judge”), 
clarified, 483 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007); Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005); 
Gariety v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004); Marcus, supra note 160, at 
59-62; Olson, supra note 2, at 964-65. 
 
165See FIELD ET AL., supra note 128, at 1493. 
 
166See Davis & Cramer, supra note 150, at 34-35, 36 (arguing that a certification ruling 
would preclude the jury and so violate the Seventh Amendment); Michael J. Kaufman & John M. 
Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities 
Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 357-60 (2010) (same). 
 
167See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540-41 (1970); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
150, § 1801. 
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have to undergo that expense and risk. Moreover, retrying an issue creates the risk 
of inconsistent determinations, which can be thorny when emanating from the 
same suit. The difficulty this argument runs into, aside from any potential Seventh 
Amendment concerns, is once again that there simply is no doctrine of intrasuit 
res judicata to do the work. If one wants to pursue such policies relating to 
efficiency and fairness, the most promising route168 involves resort to the already 
applicable doctrine called law of the case. 
 
2. Law of the Case 
 
 A doctrine that bears some resemblance both to res judicata and to stare 
decisis is law of the case.169 Despite its name, it now can apply to rulings on fact 
as well as on law. It is similar to stare decisis170 in that it applies rather flexibly, 
so that a court may revisit the ruling if convinced there is good reason to do so. It 
is similar to res judicata in that it applies narrowly, albeit in a different range. It 
does not apply beyond the parties to the case in which the ruling was rendered.171 
Indeed, the ruling can be binding as the law of the case only during the later 
conduct of the very case in which the ruling was made, that is, within the context 
of the initial action.172 It will not bind the parties, or anyone else, in later 
proceedings that are not part of the same case. 
 
 Basically, the law-of-the-case doctrine means that a question once actually 
resolved in the course of litigation will not lightly be reconsidered at later stages 
in the same action, except by a higher court, even if the point was erroneously 
decided: 
 
 Within a single lawsuit the general principles mentioned [in 
connection with stare decisis and res judicata]—desire for consistency, 
desire to terminate litigation, desire to maintain the prestige of courts—
have some meaning. There is a feeling that the various phases of a lawsuit 
should be consistent one with another; that the same matter should not be 
the subject of repetitious, time-consuming hearings; that public confidence 
must be preserved in the judicial system by adhering to a decision once 
                                                 
 
168Other, less feasible routes include eliminating the overlapping threshold questions or 
postponing them until trial. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action 
Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51, 55-59 (2004) (criticizing such “strong-form rules”). 
 
169See generally 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4478-4478.6 (2d ed. 2002) (stressing the great 
development of the doctrine in recent times); cf. Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit 
Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 1 (presenting an older and somewhat narrower view). 
 
170See generally Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 411 (2010). 
 
171See 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 169, § 4478.5, at 809-14. 
 
172See id. § 4478, at 637-45. 
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made. These attitudes have been reflected in numerous cases which have 
involved the “law of the case” doctrine.173 
 
This does not mean, of course, that the parties may not directly challenge rulings 
by regular procedures, such as by appeal or by motion for rehearing en banc. But 
if the ruling has withstood such direct challenges, as for instance when a case has 
been appealed and remanded, or if the direct challenge that might have been made 
was not, the ruling is said to have become the law of that particular case and is 
ordinarily not subject to reexamination. 
 
 There are many exceptions to the application of the rule of law of the case. 
One may well question whether the interests of judicial economy served by the 
doctrine are generally of such importance as to justify holding parties to erroneous 
rulings that could still be corrected within the framework of the same case. In 
view of the lesser justification of the law-of-the-case doctrine, it is not surprising 
that courts have not applied it with as much rigor and consistency as they have 
shown in connection with res judicata. The “ ‘law of the case,’ as applied to the 
effect of previous orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the 
same case, merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen 
what has been decided, not a limit to their power.”174 
 
 In summary, then, law of the case, intended to foster judicial economy, 
provides that a court, and any coordinate or lower courts as well, will normally 
adhere to a ruling it has declared in a particular action when a party later raises the 
point again in the same action. But it applies very flexibly, so that the rendering 
court and coordinate courts can revisit the ruling if convinced it was wrong or 
some other reason counsels reconsideration. If so interpreted as mere maxims that 
a court will not lightly redo what has been done and that lower courts must obey 
higher courts, then law of the case expresses only the common sense of 
“protecting against the agitation of settled issues”175 or “disciplined self-
consistency,”176 and does some good and little harm. 
 
 As to the good it accomplishes, it says that any issue’s first determination 
will normally stand, obviating the need for reconsideration. This normal 
application will work to retrieve the efficiency and fairness that reconsideration 
otherwise would put at risk. 
 
                                                 
 
173Vestal, supra note 169, at 1. 
 
174Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). 
 
175Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988) (quoting 1B 
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 Its constraint is never really confining. Accordingly, it will not always 
apply. In fact, the Seventh Amendment as interpreted in Beacon Theatres-Dairy 
Queen dictates allowing the jury to reconsider any issue on which a constitutional 
jury trial right exists.177 More generally, the court retains the power to reconsider. 
Because of this flexibility, it necessitates no sequencing rules. But, because its 
flexibility allows for reconsideration sometimes, it creates the risk of inconsistent 
decisions. That is the harm it imposes. 
 
 When the later determination contradicts the earlier, what to do?178 Except 
where the adjudicator has newly found jurisdiction to be lacking,179 the judge 
need not go back and correct the earlier decision, unless the judge thinks that 
undoing the earlier decision is desirable. But clearly it would be best to minimize 
the occasion for inconsistency, as by regularly relying on the law-of-the-case 
doctrine. An alternative would be to rationalize away the inconsistency by 
construing the “common” issues to be different after all or to be governed by 
different standards or burdens of proof.180 
 
C. Summary 
 
 Upon trial of a factual issue common to the merits of both law and equity 
claims for relief joined in the same case, a federal court must give the issue first to 
the jury for decision. The verdict will bind the judge with respect to the equitable 
claim. These two consequences derive from the Seventh Amendment. 
 
 This sequencing rule thus has a very limited range of application. 
Although it applies if a case for, say, injunction and damages happens to reach 
trial, it does not reach the situation of a judge deciding a threshold issue like 
jurisdiction, class certification, or evidential admissibility. The reason is that in 
these latter situations, there will be no intrasuit preclusion and hence no 
requirement to go first to the jury. 
 
 Once again, however, the courts suffer uncertainty about the reach of this 
sequencing rule. Accordingly, they defer overly to fears of intruding on the jury 
                                                 
 
177See supra text accompanying notes 138 & 142. 
 
178The question of which determination will have res judicata effect is not quite so 
difficult. It would probably be the later one, either by operation of the essential-to-judgment 
requirement or perhaps by analogy to the last-in-time rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 27 cmts. h, m (1982). 
 
179See, e.g., H.V. Allen Co. v. Quip-Matic, Inc., 266 S.E.2d 768, 769 (N.C. Ct. App.) 
(reversing defendant’s victory on the merits while granting dismissal on overlapping issue of 
personal jurisdiction), appeal dismissed, 273 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. 1980). 
 
180See Clermont, supra note 17, at 978-1000 (establishing that the standard of proof for 
jurisdiction is less demanding than the standard applicable to the merits). 
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right. Efforts herein to dissipate the fog should pay dividends in establishing the 
narrow limits of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen on courts’ sequencing power: 
 
Sequencing and Preclusion Law of the Case 
in case of joinder of legal and 
equitable claims for relief, the 
common factual issues go first to the 
jury and then the verdict binds the 
judge, both rules being by virtue of 
the Seventh Amendment 
for all other intrasuit common issues, 
there is no sequencing rule, but then 
there is neither foreclosure of the jury 
nor any other foreclosure beyond the 
flexible law-of-the-case doctrine 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Courts in federal civil cases can sequence their decision of multiple issues 
as they wish, except for the narrow Steel Co.-Ruhrgas and Beacon Theatres-Dairy 
Queen rules. The former rule generally requires a federal court to decide Article 
III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction before ruling on the merits. The 
latter rule requires a federal trial judge to give first to the jury a factual issue 
common to the merits of a law claim for relief and an equity claim for relief 
joined in the same case. 
 
 In conjunction with sequencing, some special preclusion will result. On 
the one hand, Article III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction will most 
often enjoy preclusive effect, under the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction 
doctrine for affirmative decisions or the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction 
doctrine for negative decisions, or by virtue of hypothetical jurisdiction for 
purposefully skipped decisions. On the other hand, upon repetitive encounter of 
overlapping matters in the same lawsuit, the decisionmaker can reconsider its 
decision without any intrasuit preclusion, except for the jury’s Seventh 
Amendment preclusion of the judge and except for the flexible restraint of the 
law-of-the-case doctrine. 
